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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No.  09-1635
            
MS. RACHAEL SCHAAR, 
                                                         Appellant,
v.
LEHIGH VALLEY HEALTH SERVICES, INC.; 
LEHIGH VALLEY PHYSICIANS BUSINESS SERVICES,
INC.
                                                         
            
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Number: 07-cv-04135)
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Perkin
            
Argued December 15, 2009
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN,
Circuit Judges.
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Darren M. Creasy
A. James Johnston
Post & Schell
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Four Penn Center, 14th Floor
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Attorneys for Appellees
            
OPINION OF THE COURT
            
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Rachael Schaar appeals the District Court’s summary
judgment in favor of her former employer, Lehigh Valley
Physicians Business Services, Inc. (Lehigh Valley).  The District
Court held that Schaar did not qualify for leave under the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) because she did not present
3evidence of a serious health condition.  This appeal raises a
question of first impression in this Court: whether a combination
of expert and lay testimony can establish that an employee was
incapacitated for more than three days as required by the
FMLA’s implementing regulations.
I.
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s
summary judgment, viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party.  Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582
F.3d 500, 502 (3d Cir. 2009).  “Summary judgment is
appropriate only if there are no genuine issues of material fact
such that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Id.
A.
Schaar worked as a medical receptionist for Lehigh
Valley from December 2002 until her termination on October 3,
2005.  Two weeks before she was fired, on September 21, 2005,
Schaar was treated for low back pain, fever, nausea and
vomiting.  Dr. Twaddle, who also worked for Lehigh Valley,
diagnosed Schaar with a urinary tract infection, fever and low
back pain.  His records indicate that Schaar was “comfortable
and nontoxic.”
Dr. Twaddle placed Schaar on a clear diet and prescribed
an anti-inflammatory for her back.  He also prescribed an
antibiotic for the infection, to be taken once a day for at least
three days.  During his deposition, Dr. Twaddle testified that the
4antibiotic should have lowered Schaar’s fever and eliminated
her symptoms after a day or two.  Nevertheless, Dr. Twaddle
testified that it was “possible, although very unlikely” that
Schaar would not be fully recovered enough to work after three
days.
At the end of the visit, Dr. Twaddle wrote a note advising
Schaar’s supervisor, office manager Patricia Chromczak, that
Schaar’s illness prevented her from working Wednesday,
September 21, and Thursday, September 22.  In the note, Dr.
Twaddle stated Schaar was under his care “for febrile illness and
will be unable to perform duties at work today or tomorrow.”
Though there is some dispute about what Dr. Twaddle told
Schaar, she claims he offered to speak with Chromczak upon her
arrival at work.  Schaar then taped the note to Chromczak’s door
and went home.  Schaar did not seek any further treatment with
Dr. Twaddle.
Consistent with Dr. Twaddle’s note, Schaar took paid
sick leave on September 21 and 22 and was in bed with pain,
fever and vomiting.  As chance would have it, Schaar had
previously scheduled vacation days on Friday, September 23 and
Monday, September 26.  Schaar claims she spent Friday,
September 23 in bed because she was still vomiting and
nauseous.  Although she a felt a little better on Saturday, she
spent that day in bed as well.  By Sunday, Schaar claims she felt
well enough to go to the couch, but was still ill.  On Monday,
Schaar testified she was well enough to do some housework, and
she returned to Lehigh Valley the following day, Tuesday,
September 27, 2005.
5Upon returning to work, Schaar told Chromczak that she
had been sick all weekend.  Schaar neither requested FMLA
leave nor asked Lehigh Valley to convert her two paid vacation
days into paid sick days, however.  Though their conversation is
disputed, Schaar claims Chromczak threatened to fire her for
violating the company policy requiring her to call off on her two
sick days.  When Schaar told Chromczak she thought the policy
did not apply because she left a note, Chromczak said she was
going to consult with human resources about the next step.
After doing so, Chromczak was told that Schaar’s decision to
leave a note in lieu of calling off was not a terminable offense.
Six days later, on October 3, 2005, Schaar was
terminated.  In a written explanation, Chromczak stated: “[o]n
9/21/05 Rachael brought a note from her doctor for a 2 day
excuse from work. She taped the note to manager’s door and
left, never calling off from work.”  Chromczak also listed
several mistakes and performance issues relating to essential
aspects of Schaar’s job, including improperly listing co-
payments on bank deposit slips.  Schaar had been disciplined in
the past for similar issues, including several warnings that
culminated in a one-day suspension without pay in October
2004.  After the suspension Schaar was again warned to improve
within 60 days and that failure to improve would “lead to
disciplinary action and/or termination.”
B.
Schaar sued Lehigh Valley, claiming interference and
discrimination in violation of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et
 Schaar also sued Lehigh Valley’s parent company,1
Lehigh Valley Health Services, Inc.
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seq.   In its motion for summary judgment, Lehigh Valley1
argued Schaar did not qualify for FMLA leave because she
failed to establish she was incapacitated for three days and failed
to give proper notice that she may qualify for leave.
Alternatively, Lehigh Valley argued that it could not be liable
because it fired Schaar for violating the call-in policy, not for
taking FMLA leave, and because it would have fired her anyway
for poor performance.
The District Court granted Lehigh Valley’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that Schaar did not establish a
serious health condition because she failed to present medical
evidence that she was incapacitated for more than three days.
Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., No. 07-4135, 2009
WL 323140, at *4-*6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2009).  The District
Court reasoned that expert medical testimony is necessary to
establish that the incapacity was “due to” the illness.  Id.
Schaar filed this timely appeal, arguing that the District
Court erred in granting summary judgment on her FMLA
claims.  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
II.
 An employee is eligible if she worked for a covered2
employer for at least 12 months and for at least 1,250 hours
during the previous 12 months.  29 U.S.C. § 2611(2).
 A covered employer is “any person engaged in3
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who
7
The purpose of the FMLA is “to balance the demands of
the workplace with the needs of families.”  29 U.S.C.
§ 2601(b)(1).  Accordingly, the FMLA “entitle[s] employees to
take reasonable leave for medical reasons,” id. § 2601(b)(2), but
they must do so “in a manner that accommodates the legitimate
interests of employers.”  Id. § 2601(b)(3).  An eligible employee
is entitled “to a total of twelve workweeks of leave during any
twelve month period” but only if the employee has a “serious
health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the
functions of the position of such employee.”  Id.
§ 2612(a)(1)(D).  Once an employee is entitled to leave, the
FMLA prohibits an employer from interfering with it or
retaliating against an employee for taking it.  Id. § 2615(a) &
(b).
The crucial question in this appeal is whether Schaar was
entitled to take FMLA leave.  To be eligible, Schaar had to be
a covered employee working for a covered employer.  Id.
§§ 2611(2), (4)(A)(i).  She also had to suffer from a serious
health condition and give her employer adequate notice of her
need for FMLA leave.  Id. §§ 2612(a)(1)(D), (e)(2)(B).  It is
undisputed that Schaar was an eligible employee   and that2
Lehigh Valley was a covered employer.   Lehigh Valley3
employs 50 or more employees for each working day during
each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or
preceding calendar year.”  29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i).
  Regimen of continuing treatment includes “a course of4
prescription medication (e.g., an antibiotic).” 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.114(b).
 The Department of Labor regulations have since been5
renumbered.  All citations herein are to the regulations as they
existed in 2005.
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disputes, however, that Schaar suffered from a “serious health
condition” and that she gave adequate notice.  The District Court
granted Lehigh Valley summary judgment, finding that Schaar
did not present a triable issue of fact on a serious health
condition, without addressing the question of notice.
As relevant to this appeal, the FMLA defines serious
health condition as “an illness, injury, impairment, or physical
or mental condition that involves . . . continuing treatment by a
health care provider.”  Id. § 2611(11).  A Department of Labor
regulation further defines continuing treatment by a health care
provider as a “period of incapacity . . . of more than three
consecutive calendar days . . . that also involves . . . [t]reatment
by a health care provider on at least one occasion which results
in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of
the health care provider.”   29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a) (2005).4 5
Incapacity means the “inability to work, attend school or
9perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health
condition, treatment therefore, or recovery therefrom.”  Id.
The only issue in dispute is whether Schaar presented
evidence that she was incapacitated for more than three days.
The District Court held Schaar had to establish more than three
days of incapacitation through medical evidence.  Because
Schaar presented a doctor’s note that established incapacitation
for only two days and relied on her own testimony about the
remaining days, the District Court granted summary judgment
for Lehigh Valley.
Although we have not addressed the question presented
by this appeal, other courts have adopted three approaches: (1)
the evidence of incapacitation must come exclusively from a
medical professional; (2) lay testimony, on its own, is sufficient;
or (3) lay testimony can supplement medical professional
testimony or other medical evidence.
Many district courts, including those in the Third Circuit,
have held that a health care provider’s professional medical
opinion is the only evidence that can establish incapacity.  See
Schaar, 2009 WL 323140, at *4-*6 (compiling cases).  These
decisions reason that a medical expert is required to establish
that the employee was incapacitated because of the injury or
illness.  29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a) (requiring the period of
incapacitation be “due to the serious health condition”); Olsen
v. Ohio Edison Co., 979 F. Supp. 1159, 1166 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
(“It does not mean that, in the employee’s own judgment, he or
she should not work . . . . Rather, it means that a ‘health care
provider’ has determined that, in his or her professional medical
10
judgment, the employee cannot work (or could not have
worked) because of the illness.”).
Contrary to the aforementioned district courts, all of the
circuit courts of appeals to address the question we now
consider have held that lay testimony can create a genuine issue
of material fact regarding incapacitation.  Lubke v. City of
Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 495-96 (5th Cir. 2006); Rankin v.
Seagate Techs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (8th Cir. 2001);
Marchisheck v. San Mateo County, 199 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th
Cir. 1999); see also Haefling v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 169
F.3d 494, 499-500 (7th Cir. 1999) (looking for evidence of
incapacitation in the employee’s diary and deposition
testimony).  Some of our sister circuits have held that lay
testimony alone is sufficient to establish incapacitation, while
others have held that lay testimony may be used to supplement
medical evidence.
The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
hold that lay testimony is sufficient, by itself, to establish
incapacitation.  Lubke, 455 F.3d at 495-96; Marchisheck, 199
F.3d at 1074.  The Fifth Circuit has held that expert medical
testimony is not “necessary to demonstrate [the employee’s]
incapacitation.”  Lubke, 455 F.3d at 495-96.  The Ninth Circuit
has gone even farther, holding lay testimony creates a genuine
issue of material fact even when all medical evidence is to the
contrary.  Marchisheck, 199 F.3d at 1072-75.  In Marchisheck,
the employee took time off to care for her son.  The treating
physician said the boy was “feel[ing] remarkably well” and sent
him home without any restrictions, id. at 1071, but the boy said
he “did not and could not do anything for four or five days.”  Id.
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at 1074.  The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment, stating:
“Notwithstanding the stronger evidence to the contrary, [the
boy’s] declaration creates a disputed issue of fact and precludes
summary judgment on the issue of ‘incapacity.’”  Id.
Taking a more restrictive approach than the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit has allowed lay testimony only
to supplement incomplete medical evidence.  Rankin, 246 F.3d
at 1148-49.  In Rankin, the employee visited the doctor for a
routine check up and discussed her illness with the nurses.  Id.
at 1146.  A week later when the severity became more apparent,
she phoned the nurse practitioner complaining of vomiting,
coughing, congestion, and sleeplessness and was then examined
by the nurse practitioner who diagnosed a viral illness.  Id.  The
employee was prescribed cough suppressants, a decongestant
and an inhaler.  Id.  The Eighth Circuit held that the employee’s
testimony, combined with the medical evidence from the nurses
and nurse practitioner, created a genuine issue of material fact
regarding incapacitation.  Id. at 1148-49.
III.
Our interpretation is guided by the statute and the
Department of Labor regulations.  Congress vested the Secretary
of Labor with the authority to “prescribe such regulations as are
necessary to carry out” the FMLA provisions.  29 U.S.C.
§ 2654.  Acting on that authority, the Secretary promulgated a
 As a result, we have held that Chevron deference6
applies to these regulations, Sommer v. Vanguard Group, 461
F.3d 397, 399 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006), except when they contradict
the statute.  See Erdman, 582 F.3d at 507.
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series of regulations.   29 C.F.R. § 825 et seq.  We interpret6
those regulations using our well-established canons of statutory
interpretation.
The regulation at issue in this case provides that the
ambiguous statutory language “continuing treatment by a health
care provider,” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11)(b), can be satisfied by
showing at least three days of incapacitation.  29 C.F.R.
§ 825.114.  This regulation does not speak to whether medical
testimony is required.  In the very next regulation, however, the
Department of Labor requires a “health care provider” to
determine that an employee is “unable to perform the functions
of the position.”  Id. § 825.115.  Because the incapacitation
regulation does not require, or even mention, a health care
provider determination, id. § 825.114, we find no support in the
regulations to exclude categorically all lay testimony regarding
the length of an employee’s incapacitation.  Cf. Jama v. ICE,
543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (“We do not lightly assume that
Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it
nonetheless intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater
when Congress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it
knows how to make such a requirement manifest.”).
Contrary to the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, however, we do
not find lay testimony, by itself, sufficient to create a genuine
13
issue of material fact.  Some medical evidence is still necessary
to show that the incapacitation was “due to” the serious health
condition.  29 C.F.R. § 825.114.  This does not place an undue
burden on employees because they must present some medical
evidence anyway to establish the inability to perform the
functions of the position.  Id. § 825.115.  In contrast, allowing
unsupported lay testimony would place too heavy a burden on
employers to inquire into an employee’s eligibility for FMLA
leave based solely on the employee’s self-diagnosed illness.  For
these reasons, we hold that an employee may satisfy her burden
of proving three days of incapacitation through a combination
of expert medical and lay testimony.
Viewing the facts of this appeal in the light most
favorable to Schaar, Dr. Twaddle wrote that Schaar was
incapacitated for two days because of her illness.  When that
expert medical opinion is combined with Schaar’s lay testimony
that she was incapacitated for two additional days, it necessarily
follows that a material issue of fact exists as to whether Schaar
suffered from a “serious health condition.”  Of course, we
express no opinion as to whether Schaar’s lay testimony
regarding her incapacitation is credible and we do not reach the
question of the adequacy of her notice because the District Court
did not address it.
For the reasons explained herein, we will vacate the
judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further
proceedings.
